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Abstract
Objective People have the intuition that hunger undermines social cooperation, but
experimental tests of this have often produced null results. One possible explanation is
that the experimental tasks used are not rich enough to capture the diverse pathways by
which social cooperation can be sustained or break down in real life. We studied the
effects of hunger on cooperation in two tasks of differential interaction richness.
Methods We manipulated hunger by asking participants to eat, or refrain from eating,
breakfast. Participants in experiment 1 (n = 106) played a one-shot Ultimatum Game.
Participants in experiment 2 (n = 264) played twenty rounds of a Public Goods Game in
the same groups of four, ten rounds with the possibility of punishing other group
members, and ten without.
Results In experiment 1, skipping breakfast had no significant effects on either amounts
proposed or minimum acceptable offers. In experiment 2, there were multiple different
significant effects of the manipulation. No-breakfast participants were more generous in
the first round of the game without punishment, and in subsequent rounds, were more
influenced by what other group members had done the round before. In the punishment
game, no-breakfast participants were also less likely to punish their group-mates than
breakfast participants. Consequently, the possibility of punishment was less effective in
increasing group cooperation levels in no-breakfast groups.
Conclusion Replicating earlier findings, we found a null effect of hunger on coopera-
tion in a one-shot Ultimatum Game. However, in our richer Public Goods Game, the
dynamics of cooperation differed with hunger, in subtle ways not simply classifiable as
hungry participants being ‘more’ or ‘less’ cooperative overall.
Keywords Cooperation . Hunger . Altruistic punishment . Economic game . Decision
latency
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General Introduction
People have a clear intuition that hunger undermines social cooperation. For example,
in a recent survey study, 73% of participants stated that they believe hunger makes
people less cooperative (Häusser et al. 2019; study 5). The anthropological literature is
full of accounts of ‘famine crime’ (Arnold 1993); chronic hunger curtailing all gener-
osity (Richards 1932); or individuals becoming ‘atomistic’ and ‘egotistical’ when food
is short (Turnbull 1972). These accounts seem intuitively compelling, though an oddity
is that the literature also contains many claims of hunger apparently bringing people
together to share (Dirks 1980).
Given the generality of the belief that hunger must undermine cooperation, it is not
surprising that researchers have studied the effects of short-term hunger manipulations
on laboratory cooperation paradigms, usually with the expectation that the hungry
participants will cooperate less than controls. Though some studies report results
conforming to expectation (Briers et al. 2006; Xu et al. 2014; Harel and Kogut
2015), other results have been null. Hausser et al. (2019) either manipulated or
measured hunger prior to a series of different cooperation tasks and measures (eco-
nomic games, survey measures and a volunteering task), finding no significant hunger
effects on any outcome. Similarly, Rantapuska et al. (2017) administered a series of
economic games and cooperative decisions to overnight-fasted participants who had
been given either a standardized meal or not prior to the session. Hungry participants
were significantly more cooperative in a prisoner’s dilemma, and tended to be more
cooperative in the sender role of a trust game, whilst donations to charity, contributions
in a public goods game, and behaviour in the sender role of the trust game were not
significantly different. Thus, the corrosive effect of hunger on cooperation that people
intuitively feel should be present, and the anthropological literature suggests may often
exist when hunger is widespread and chronic in society, does not reliably show up
when acute hunger is manipulated in the experimental psychology laboratory.
One possible reason for the gulf between the lay belief and anthropological literature
on the one hand, and the experimental results on the other, is that the experimental
paradigms used do not capture the relevant features of real-world social cooperation.
One can think of laboratory cooperation tasks as being on a continuum of interaction
richness. At one end of the continuum are one-shot, non-interdependent paradigms
such as the Dictator Game (DG) where the actor’s outcome does not depend on the
decisions of others, and there are no social consequences possible within the game.
Inter-dependent tasks such as the Ultimatum Game (UG) are somewhat richer, in that
the proposer’s outcome is affected by the behaviour of the responder. Richer still are
paradigms like the multi-round Public Goods Game (PGG) with punishment. Here,
participants can respond to the previous behaviour of other group members; can choose
to actively sanction others; can respond to being sanction by their behaviour in future
rounds, and so on.
The experimental effects of hunger on cooperation have been most studied in tasks
towards the less rich end of the continuum. Many of these are DG or unconditional
donation-style tasks (Briers et al. 2006; Xu et al. 2014; Harel and Kogut 2015), whilst
Rantapuska et al. (2017) used two tasks that were interdependent, but where there was
no possibility for one player to sanction the other and no repeated interaction between
the same players. Häusser et al. (2019) extended the set of tasks studied to include the
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Ultimatum Game. Here, the second player (the responder) has the possibility of
sanctioning the first player (the proposer), by refusing a low offer even though this
will be costly to themselves. However, even in the study by Häusser et al. (2019), there
was no repeated interaction between the same players, and hence no possibility of rich
interpersonal dynamics.
Which kind of task is adequate for experimentally modelling the likely real-world
effects of hunger on cooperation depends upon one’s expectations about what mech-
anisms might underlie those effects. For example, if hunger has a strong direct negative
effect on prosocial motivation, then a one-shot DG-style task should show it clearly.
Current support for the existence of such a direct effect is weak (Häusser et al. 2019).
However, even in the absence of such a direct effect, there are other pathways by which
hunger could cause the results of cooperative endeavours to turn out differently in the
real world. For example, hungry people might have the same initial prosocial motiva-
tions as non-hungry people, but respond more negatively or less forgivingly to the
behaviour of others. This possibility is supported by large literatures showing that
hunger increases irritability (see Nettle 2017). This would suggest a more rapid ‘race to
the bottom’ in complex cooperative tasks where the interactants are hungry, especially
once at least one group member is not cooperating fully. On the other hand, Nettle
(2019) hypothesizes that, when hungry, people might switch to imitating others rather
than extensive individual computation of costs and benefits, since such computation is
metabolically expensive. This would predict that hungry groups would be more likely
than non-hungry groups to converge on a shared norm. This norm need not necessarily
be a non-cooperative one, however; it could be either cooperative or non-cooperative,
depending on members’ initial behaviour.
In real-world settings, cooperation may be sustained by punishment, namely inter-
ventions to impact others at cost to oneself. Punishment is thought to be important in
maintaining human cooperation over time in realistic scenarios (Boyd and Richerson
1992; Fehr and Gächter 2002). Hungry people could use punishment differently. Here,
previous findings would licence predictions in either direction. On the one hand,
punishment can be seen as a form of aggression, and aggression is generally increased
by hunger, or low blood glucose (DeWall et al. 2011; Bushman et al. 2014). This
suggests the prediction that there would be more punishment when people are hungry,
and hence possibly more cooperation, though this would depend on whether the
increased punishment under hunger was effectively directed at non-cooperators, or
devolved into antisocial or revenge punishment (Raihani and Bshary 2019). On the
other hand, recent studies have found that hunger reduces moral disapproval (Vicario
et al. 2018), and leads people to suggest more lenient punishments for moral violations
(Kerry et al. 2019). The authors of these studies speculate that hunger down-regulates
disgust, an emotion important in regulating food intake, but also in moral decision-
making. These findings suggest that hungry people would punish less, again possibly
leading to less cooperation.
In short, there are a number of pathways by which the outcomes of real-world
cooperative endeavours might end up different when participants are hungry com-
pared to not hungry. These pathways are generally not captured by the very simple
cooperation tasks used in the experimental literature so far. Though these pathways
could lead cooperation to break down under hunger, as the lay belief suggests, they
could under certain circumstances lead to more cooperation when people are
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hungry. Predictions are possible in either direction, and it is not clear a priori which
pathway might be the most important.
In this paper, we report the results of two experiments in which we manipulated
hunger and studied the effects on cooperative behaviour. Our overall aim was to extend
the interactional richness of the experimental literature on hunger and cooperation, and
hence explore the possibility of effects of hunger on cooperative behaviour that would
not be detectable in a simple DG. In study 1, we introduced the possibility of
punishment, of a kind, by using a UG (Guth et al. 1982). At the time of conception,
this was novel. However, in the interim, the paper by Häusser et al. (2019) appeared,
and so our experiment 1 became a replication of their study 2. In experiment 2, we used
a multi-round PGG with punishment (Fehr and Gachter 2000). This incorporates much
richer behavioural possibilities than any previous paradigm.
Note that our two experiments differ from one another in multiple ways. The UG is
usually considered a test of preference for fairness within dyads, whilst the PGG is
thought of as a way of studying the factors affecting the ability of groups to maintain
public goods. The UG of experiment 1 includes a possible sanction of the proposer by
the responder, but this is not framed as punishment as such. Moreover, as there was
only one round, there was no potential to change the other player’s behaviour within
the game. The two parameters that can be measured from the UG are the proposer’s
offer, which may reflect both their prosociality and their inferences about the likely
behaviour of the responder; and the responder’s minimum acceptable offer, which can
be considered their preference for fairness or willingness to punish unfairness. By
contrast, the PGG in experiment 2 allows separate measurement of the participant’s
initial offer (which might be a considered a simple measure of prosocial motivation),
their response in later rounds to what others did in earlier ones, their propensity to
punish, and their response to being punished. (Fehr and Gachter 2000; Gunnthorsdottir
et al. 2007). Hunger could have separate effects on any these, resulting in different
evolution of group public goods over time.
We did not pre-register predictions for either experiment. Although we were driven
by the standard hypothesis that hunger will lead to less cooperation, as we have
discussed above, there are several variables where it is possible to make predictions
for the effect of hunger in either direction. We therefore present the results as explor-
atory, and conclusions as suitably tentative. We also present a systematic comparison of
the results of the two experiments, following the individual results presentations.
Experiment 1: Introduction
Experiment 1 was performed after experiment 2, but they are presented in this order for
clarity of logic. Experiment 1 used a single-shot UG. In the UG, one participant proposes
a split of a monetary endowment between themselves and another participant. The
responder either accepts the split, in which case the money is paid, or rejects it, in which
case both participants receive nothing. We, however, used the strategy method, whereby
the responders specifies, for every possible offer the proposer might make, whether they
would accept or reject. The income-maximising strategy for the responder is to accept
any non-zero offer. The income-maximising strategy for the proposer is to propose the
lowest offer likely to be acceptable to the responder. In practice, low but non-zero offers
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are typically rejected, and responders offermore than they would need to have their offers
accepted (Oosterbeek et al. 2004; Tisserand et al. 2015). Hausser et al. (2019; study 2)
randomly assigned overnight-fasted participants to either complete the UG hungry, or
receive food first. They found no significant hunger effect for either role.
We manipulated hunger by asking participants to either skip breakfast on the day of
the experimental session, or to eat breakfast as usual. We have used this manipulation
before, and shown it to be effective in producing differences in impulsivity as well as
self-reported hunger (Allen and Nettle 2019). All players completed UGs both as
proposer and responder, and we report the effects of the no-breakfast manipulation
on both decisions. As we did not pre-register predictions, and were unaware of the
results of Hausser et al. (2019; study 2) when we performed the study, we present our
analyses as exploratory.
In addition to the main measures, we collected data on participants’ latency to
decide, and also a cognitive reflection test (CRT). This is a widely used measure of
deliberate versus intuitive decision-making. In many of the cooperation tasks used by
psychologists and behavioural economists, a quick, intuitive decision tends to favour
more cooperation, since participants then use simple heuristics derived from real-life
social encounters (Rand 2016). It is participants who deliberate more extensively about
the specific payoff structure of the game who realise that cooperation is not the income-
maximising strategy. Hungry participants tend to use faster or more intuitive styles of
decision-making (Orquin and Kurzban 2016). Thus, as Rantapuska et al. (2017) point
out, we might expect hungry participants to be more cooperative, through deliberating
less. If this were the case, we should be able to detect experimental effects on decision
latency and cognitive reflection, and associations between decision latency and cogni-
tive reflection and cooperative decisions in the UG.
Methods
Participants
We recruited 106 participants from registers held at Newcastle University (66 male, 40
female). Participants were mostly students. Due to use of genuine randomization to
assign participants to conditions, our experimental groups were not equal in size
(breakfast, 60; no-breakfast 46). A compromise power analysis using GPower (Faul
et al. 2007) indicated that these group sizes would give us 77% power to detect a
medium-sized (d = 0.5) simple experimental effect. All participants gave written in-
formed consent to participate. Participants attended singly and made their decisions at a
computer with the experimenter withdrawing. They received a £5 gift voucher as a
show-up fee, in addition to whatever money they took away from the UG. The
experiment was approved by the Faculty of Medical Sciences ethics committee,
Newcastle University.
Ultimatum Game
Each participant completed both the proposer and responder role of the UG, with the
order counterbalanced. Game rules were fully explained prior to the first role, and the
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participant was given a chance to ask questions. The decisions of the previous
participant were used to decide game outcome. Information on the other player’s
decisions was not provided until both proposer and responder decisions had been
made. At the end of the session, money from one of the two roles was paid out
according to game decisions, a visible coin toss deciding which one.
For the proposer role, the participant chose an amount to offer by moving a bar on a
computer screen anywhere from £0 to £10 in increments of £0.50. The responder role
used the strategy method: participants were provided with a list of all the 21 possible
offers the proposer might make, and indicated which ones they would accept. From
this, we calculated the participant’s minimum acceptable offer.
Cognitive Reflection Test
Participants completed a version of the CRT after completing the UG. We used an 8-item
test, using the original three items introduced by Frederick (2005), four further items from
the expanded version of the test (Toplak et al. 2014), and an additional item featured in
Trouche, Sander and Mercier (2014). Each item consists of a question (e.g. ‘If it takes 5
machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100
widgets?’) with intuitively obvious but wrong answers (e.g. 100 min), and a correct answer
(5 min) that requires more deliberation. The score is the number of correct items, which
should reflect the degree of deliberation an individual is using.
No-Breakfast Manipulation
Participants were invited to take part in the study via email. This email instructed them
to either eat as normal, or refrain from eating, breakfast on the morning of the session.
Self-reported compliance was collected in an initial questionnaire, as was self-reported
hunger on a ten-point scale.
Data Analysis
Data were analysed using general linear models in R (R Core Development Team 2018).
Our main outcome variables were the proposer amount offered, and the responder mini-
mum acceptable offer. Secondary variables were the latency to decide in both roles, and
scores on the CRT. Experimental effects were primarily analysed on an intention to treat
basis. That is, we used as our explanatory variable the condition to which the participant
was assigned. However, since compliance with the instructions was not perfect (see
Results), we also reran all analyses using self-rated hunger as the explanatory variable;
none of the results reported below was affected. Decision latencies were log-transformed.
Results
Manipulation Checks
Of the participants assigned to the breakfast condition, 75% reported that they
had in fact eaten breakfast. Of those assigned to the no-breakfast condition,
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95.7% reported that they had in fact skipped breakfast. Participants in the no-
breakfast condition reported being significantly hungrier (mean 6.13, s.d. 2.06)
than those in the breakfast condition (mean 3.23, s.d. 2.29, t = 6.73, p < 0.001,
d = 1.33). There were no significant differences in amount offered or minimum
acceptable offer according to the order the two UG roles were played in
(amount offered: first, 4.82, s.d. 1.87; second, 4.84, s.d. 1.29; t = 0.06, p =
0.95, d = 0.01; minimum acceptable offer: first, 3.50, s.d. 1.57; second, 3.32,
s.d. 1.61; t = 0.57, p = 0.57, d = 0.11). There was a marginally non-significant,
weak negative correlation between participants’ proposed amounts and their
minimum acceptable offers (r = −0.18. p = 0.06).
Experimental Effects: Proposer Role
There was no significant effect of condition on amount offered in the proposer role
(B = 0.11, s.e. 0.32, t = 0.33, p = 0.740), though the mean was slightly higher for the no-
breakfast condition (breakfast: 4.78, s.d. 1.33; no breakfast: 4.89, s.d. 2.01). The
distribution of offers was dominated by a mode of £5 (i.e. 50% of the stake; Fig. 1a).
This constituted 42% of all offers. Dividing offers dichotomously into those of 50% of
the stake or more, and those less than 50% of the stake, the association of offer type
with condition was not significant (χ2 = 0.85, p = 0.36). Amongst breakfast
participants, 57% offered 50% of the stake or more; amongst no-breakfast participants,
67% did.
Experimental Effects: Responder Role
There was no significant difference in minimum acceptable offer by condition (B =
0.32, s.e. 0.32, t = 1.02, p = 0.31). The mean minimum acceptable offer was slightly
higher for the no-breakfast condition (breakfast: 3.26, s.d. 1.53; no breakfast: 3.58, s.d.
1.66). This was driven by a non-significant trend for more responders to demand fully
50% of the stake in the no breakfast condition (35% of responders in no breakfast
condition; 20% in breakfast condition; χ2 = 2.22, p = 0.14; Fig. 1b).
Fig. 1 Experiment 1 results. a Distribution of amounts proposed in the UG, by experimental condition. b
Distribution of minimum acceptable offers, by experimental condition. N = 106 (60 in the breakfast condition,
46 in the no-breakfast condition)
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Decision Latency
There was no effect of condition on decision latency in either the proposer role
(breakfast: 3.26 log seconds, s.d. 0.57; no breakfast: 3.24, s.d. 0.44; t = −0.18, p =
0.86), or the responder role (breakfast: 4.21, s.d. 0.45; no breakfast: 4.28, s.d. 0.47; t =
−0.75, p = 0.45). In the proposer role, there was a significant though weak positive
correlation between decision latency and amount proposed (r = 0.21, p = 0.03). In the
responder role, the association between decision latency and minimum acceptable
amount was not significantly different from zero (r = 0.02, p = 0.85).
Cognitive Reflection Test
The effect of condition on number of CRT questions correct was not significant
(breakfast: 3.73, s.d. 2.07; no breakfast: 3.26, s.d. 2.00; t = −1.18, p = 0.24). Moreover,
the no-breakfast participants did not spend any less time on the CRT questions than the
breakfast participants did (breakfast: 6.05, s.d. 0.46; no breakfast: 6.13, s.d. 0.45; t =
0.97, p = 0.33). Number of CRT questions correct was not significantly associated with
amount offered in the proposer role (r = 0.05, p = 0.65), or minimum acceptable offer in
the responder role (r = − 0.15, p = 0.13).
Experiment 1 Discussion
Using a one-shot UG, we found no clear evidence that skipping breakfast had any
effect on either the amount proposed or the minimum acceptable offer. Thus, we
reproduce the null results of a similar recent study (Häusser et al. 2019; study 2). There
was considerable variation in behaviour in both roles (Fig. 1). Although the modal
amount offered was £5.00, only a minority of participants chose this offer. Moreover,
the no-breakfast manipulation was effective in increasing self-rated hunger. Thus, the
experimental manipulation was effective, and there was variability in the outcome, so
there was scope for detecting a hunger effect if one exists.
As well as the non-significant experimental effects on the main outcomes, we did
not find a number of other relationships that we might have expected. If hunger causes
people to adopt a more intuitive, heuristic approach to social decision making, then we
expected it to make decision latencies faster, and scores on the CRT lower. The
experimental treatment had neither of these effects. Moreover, there were no relation-
ships between CRT score and UG behaviour. The amount offered as proposer actually
increased slightly with increasing time taken to decide. This is the opposite to the
prediction stated in Rand (2016), namely that in this one-shot game, more deliberation
should be associated with lower offers. However, we would note that the UG has a
structural ambiguity. Although the behaviour of the proposer is often interpreted as
representing prosocial motivation, it could also be affected by risk aversion. To offer
less, given uncertainty about the behaviour of the responder, is to risk coming away
with nothing. More deliberation may have led proposers to appreciate the greater
riskiness of making a low offer. Rand’s (2016) prediction appears about deliberation
leading to low offers seems better applicable to the simpler DG, where offering less
entails no risk.
Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology
In summary, a simple one-shot UG here revealed no significant effects of breakfast-
skipping on either the amount offered to another party, or the minimum acceptable
offer. As stated in the General Introduction, though, there may be more potentially for
revealing effects of hunger on cooperation using a task with repeated interactions
between the same individuals over time.
Experiment 2: Introduction
Experiment 2 replicated the classic PGG study of Fehr and Gachter (2000), with an
additional experimental manipulation of hunger. Participants, in groups of four, played
a sequence of ten rounds of a PGG with no possibility of punishment, and ten rounds
where they have the option to sanction one another on the basis of contributions to the
central pot. Experimental sessions were conducted in the morning, and, as for exper-
iment 1, the experimental manipulation was the instruction to either breakfast as usual
(breakfast condition), or skip breakfast (no breakfast condition). The canonical finding
in PGG experiments of this type is that, in the no-punishment game, contributions to
the central pot are in the vicinity of 50% of endowment in the first round, but
successively reduce over the rounds, approaching zero in many groups by ten rounds.
By contrast, in the punishment game, contributions are stable and may even increase
over the course of the rounds.
The data from experiment 2 allow separate estimation of the effects of hunger on a
number of different variables, all within the same dataset. These include: the contribu-
tion in the first round of the no-punishment game; themagnitude of players’ responses in
subsequent rounds to what others had done the round before; the propensity to punish
others; and the response to being punished. As we outlined in the General Introduction,
there are reasons for expecting that hunger could influence several of these variables, but
in some cases predictions could plausibly be made in either direction. We did not pre-
register predictions and present the results below as exploratory.
Methods
Participants
A total of 264 participants were recruited from registers held at Newcastle University
(132 in sample 1, 132 in sample 2; 147 female and 117 male). Participants were mostly
students. The two samples did not overlap. Participants were paid a £2 participation fee,
and in addition, credits accumulated in the PGG were converted to cash at the rate of £1
per 50 credits. Game earnings averaged 394 credits (i.e. £7.88). All participants gave
written informed consent to participate. The experiment was approved by the Faculty of
Medical Sciences ethics committee, Newcastle University.
Public Goods Game
A four-player multi-round PGG, with both a punishment and no-punishment version,
was implemented in oTree (Chen et al. 2016). Participants completed the game on
Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology
networked computers in a room with 36 individual desks with separation screens. At
least 8 participants were present per session and participants did not know which others
were members of their game group. Within each round, each player was given an initial
endowment of 20 credits, and had to decide how much, if any, to allocate to a central
pot. Allocations to the central pot were multiplied by 1.4, and the pot was divided
equally between the four group members. In the punishment version of the game,
following decisions about how much to contribute to the central pot, which were
known to all players, participants could elect to use their credits to reduce the earnings
of other group members. Each credit used for this purpose decreased the income of the
selected individual by 10% for the round, to a minimum of zero. Credits were
accumulated across rounds for final conversion into cash. Participants completed 10
rounds of the no-punishment game, and 10 rounds of the punishment game, with the
order of the two game versions counterbalanced. Group composition remained the
same for all 20 rounds.
All game information was explicitly presented in initial on-screen instructions. Prior
to the first round, participants completed three multiple-choice questions to demonstrate
understanding of game rules for the payoffs from the common fund, and an additional
two in the punishment game to demonstrate an understanding of how punishment
worked. Comprehension questions used a multiple-choice response format. On com-
pletion of the final round, participants remained at their desks and were brought a
sealed envelope containing the conversion of their accumulated credits to cash.
No-Breakfast Manipulation
Participants were invited to take part in the study via email, one to three days before the
session. This email instructed them to either eat as normal, or refrain from eating, breakfast
on the morning of the session. Self-reported compliance was collected in an initial
questionnaire, as was self-reported hunger on a ten-point scale. The experimental treatment
was randomised on a session level: that is, all participants on a given day, and therefore all
members of each game group, were in either the breakfast or no-breakfast condition.
Data Analysis
The primary outcome measures were contribution to the central pot (0–20), and
punishment allocated (punishment game only). Latency to make each decision (sec-
onds, from the decision screen appearing to the participant entering their choice) was
also recorded, and we used this as an ancillary outcome measure. Due to a server
problem, latency data were only available for 220 of the 264 participants (88 of sample
1, all 132 of sample 2). Experimental effects were analysed on an intention-to-treat
basis. That is, the independent variable was the treatment the participant had been
assigned to, rather than whether they had in fact eaten breakfast or not.
Data were analysed in R (R Core Development Team 2018) using general linear
and, where appropriate, linear mixed and generalized linear mixed models to take
account of the structure of the data (repeated rounds within participant, and participants
clustered in groups). Linear mixed models were fitted using maximum likelihood
estimation. Significance tests for parameters in mixed models used Satterthwaite’s
method via R package ‘lmerTest’.
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We first fitted a simple model of the overall pattern of contributions (model 1; full
output for all models is shown in Appendix Table A1). The a priori fixed predictors
were: game (punishment vs. no punishment) and number of previous rounds (0–9. We
expected, based on previous literature, an interaction between game and number of
previous rounds, with contributions declining over the rounds in the no punishment
game, but not the punishment game. We included experimental condition and all its
interactions (with round and game) in our model 1. Since our aims were exploratory,
we had open predictions about whether experimental effects would appear in the main
effect or interaction terms, and about their direction.
We followed up the global results of model 1 with more detailed analyses of
each game. For the no-punishment game, we modelled the effect of condition
on amount contributed in the first round (model 2). We then fitted a model on
the data from round 2 onwards, with contribution as the outcome variable, and
as predictors the participant’s contribution in the previous round, the average
contribution of the other group members in the previous round, condition, and
the interaction of condition with the average contribution of other players
(model 3). For the punishment game, we modelled the decision to punish in
relation to condition and the contributions offered by other group members
(model 4). The decision to punish was treated as binary (punish at least one
group member vs. not punish), and hence used a generalized linear mixed
model with binomial error structure. Finally, we modelled the response to
punishment (model 5). Here, the outcome variable was contribution, and the
predictors were the participant’s contribution in the previous round, whether
they were punished in the previous round, condition, and all interactions of
these predictors.
In ancillary analyses, we also examined latency to decide for both contributions and
(in the punishment game) punishment (models 6 and 7). Latencies to decide were
logged for analysis.
Results
Manipulation Checks
Of the participants assigned to the breakfast condition, 84.6% reported at the
experimental session that they had in fact eaten breakfast. Of those assigned to
the no-breakfast condition, 99.2% reported that they had in fact skipped.
Participants in the no-breakfast condition reported being significantly hungrier
(mean 5.59, s.d. 2.18) than those in the breakfast condition (mean 3.12, s.d.
2.18; t = 9.16, p < 0.001, d = 1.13). At the group level, 31 groups in the no-
breakfast condition contained four members who had not had breakfast, and
one group contained three who had not and one who had. In the breakfast
condition, 18 groups contained four participants who had had breakfast; 12
groups contained three; three groups contained two; and one group contained
one. Repeating the analyses reported below but using the number of partici-
pants in the group who had actually had breakfast produces essentially the
same results.
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Game Comprehension Questions
Comprehension questions were not all answered correctly (mean central pot questions:
4.21 out of 6, s.d. 1.67; mean punishment questions: 1.32 out of 2, s.d. 0.79). The
number of central pot questions correct predicted contributions: those who answered
more questions correctly contributed less (linear mixed model with game, number of
previous rounds and number of central pot questions correct as predictors: B = −0.31,
s.e. 0.11, t = −2.97, p = 0.003). Likewise, those who answered more punishment
questions correctly were less likely to punish (generalized linear mixed model with
mean contribution of others plus punishment questions correct: B = −0.44, s.e. 0.11,
z = −3.80, p < 0.001).
However, comprehension questions correct did not differ significantly by condition
(central pot: breakfast: 4.18, s.d. 1.72; no breakfast: 4.24, s.d. 1.62; t = −0.32, p = 0.749,
d = −0.04; punishment: breakfast: 1.27, s.d. 0.76; no breakfast: 1.37, s.d. 0.81; t =
−0.98, p = 0.329, d = −0.13. None of the results reported below for experimental
condition is affected by the inclusion of number of comprehension questions correct
as an additional predictor variable.
Overall Patterns of Contribution
The overall pattern of contributions, in relation to game, condition, and round, was as
shown in Fig. 2a. The expected basic pattern – contributions declining over the rounds
in the no-punishment game, but not in the punishment game, was clearly seen. In our
model of the overall pattern of contributions (Appendix Table 1, model 1), there was a
significant main effect of condition (B = 1.96, s.e. 0.90, t = 2.17, p = 0.033).This
suggests that participants in the no-breakfast groups contributed more in the first round
of the no-punishment game than those in the breakfast group. The interaction between
number of previous rounds and condition was not significant (B = −0.12, s.e. 0.07, t =
−1.76, p = 0.079). However, there was a significant interaction between game and
condition (B = −1.42, s.e. 0.52, t = −2.75, p = 0.006). This suggests that the possibility
of punishment was less effective in increasing contributions in the no-breakfast groups
than the breakfast groups. This is evident in Fig. 2a: the gap between the punishment
and no-punishment lines is smaller for the no-breakfast groups than the breakfast
groups. The three-way game by condition by number of previous rounds interaction
was marginally non-significant (B = 0.18, s.e. 0.10, p = 0.07).
Detailed Analyses: No-Punishment Game
For the data from the no-punishment game, we first modelled condition effects on
contributions in the first round (model 2). First-round contributions were significantly
higher in the no-breakfast groups (mean 10.20, s.d. 5.79) than the breakfast groups
(mean 8.26, s.d. 6.06; B = 1.94, s.e. 0.73, t = 2.66, p = 0.008; Fig. 2b). When then
modelled, for subsequent rounds, how a participant’s contribution was affected by the
mean contribution of other group members in the previous round, condition, and their
interaction (model 3). There was a significant interaction between condition and the
lagged contribution of other group members (B = 0.14, s.e. 0.05, t = 2.70, p = 0.007).
Participants in the no-breakfast groups were more strongly influenced than those in the
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breakfast groups by the previous-round contributions of other group members, con-
tributing less when others had contributed less, but more when others had contributed
more (Fig. 2c).
Detailed Analyses: Punishment Game
For the punishment game, we examined the decision to punish other group members in
relation to the contributions offered, condition and their interaction (model 4). There
was a significant interaction between condition and the contributions made by others
(B = −0.52, s.e. 0.16, z = −3.14, p = 0.002). Participants in the no-breakfast groups were
Fig. 2 Experimental effects in experiment 2. a Mean contribution per round, by game (solid lines: no
punishment; dotted lines: punishment) and condition (blue: breakfast; red: no breakfast). Errors represent
one between-group standard error. b Mean contribution on first round of no-punishment game, by condition.
Error bars represent one standard error. c Individual contribution in relation to the mean contribution of other
group members in the previous round, non-initial rounds of no-punishment game, by condition (blue:
breakfast; red: no breakfast). The dotted line would represent perfectly matching contributions to the previous
group mean. Lines represent linear fits from the data, and shading, 95% confidence intervals. d Probability of
punishing by mean contribution of other group members, and condition (blue: breakfast; red: no breakfast),
punishment game
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less likely to punish, especially when the contribution levels were high (Fig. 2d).
Overall, in the breakfast groups, participants chose to punish at least one other group
member on 717 of 1360 possible occasions (52.7%). In the no-breakfast group, they
chose to punish on 575 of 1280 possible occasions (44.9%; χ2 = 15.74, p < 0.001).
Finally, we examined the response to being punished, in terms of contribution the next
round (model 5). There was a significant interaction between own previous-round
contribution and being punished (B = 0.17, s.e. 0.05, t = −3.35, p < 0.001; people
who made high contributions and got punished reduced them, whilst those who made
low contributions and were punished increased them). However, none of the effects
involving condition was significant. Thus, there was no evidence that people in the no-
breakfast groups responded any differently to being punished.
Effects of Condition on Decision Latency
We examined, for the subset of participants where latency data were available, the latency
to decide how much to contribute, in relation to number of previous rounds, game and
condition (model 6; Fig. 3). There was a significant main effect of condition (B = −0.21,
s.e. 0.06, t = −3.62, p < 0.001). There was also a significant interaction between game and
condition (B = 0.30, s.e. 0.07, t = 4.52, p < 0.001); a shorter average decision latency for
no-breakfast participants was seen in the no-punishment game (breakfast: mean 10.60 s,
s.d. 30.4; no breakfast: mean 7.40 s, s.d. 7.99), but not the punishment game (breakfast:
mean 9.34 s, s.d. 11.60; no-breakfast: mean 10.10, s.d. 12.00).
The effect of condition on decision latency in the first round of the no-
punishment game did not mediate the effect of condition on contributions, since
there was only a negligible correlation between decision latency and amount
contributed (r = −0.06, p = 0.379).
We also examined, for the punishment game, the latency to decide whether to
punish other group members or not (model 7). Neither the main effect of condition,
nor its interaction with number of previous rounds, was a significant predictor.
Fig. 3 Latency to decide on how much to contribute by round, game and condition, experiment 2. Shown are
means and between-group standard errors of the group mean
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Discussion
In experiment 2, we found that a breakfast-skipping manipulation affected
behaviour in a multi-round PGG with and without the possibility of punish-
ment. The overall pattern of group contributions over time was subtly, though
statistically significantly, different between the two conditions. More detailed
analysis showed that participants’ decision-making processes differed in multi-
ple ways that cannot be neatly summarised as hungry people being ‘more’ or
‘less’ cooperative overall. In the no-punishment game, participants who had
skipped breakfast started out by contributing significantly more in the first
round. Thereafter, the no-breakfast participants were somewhat more influenced
by the contributions of the other group members in the previous round than the
breakfast participants were. Specifically, the no-breakfast participants came
closer to matching what their group-mates had on average contributed in the
previous round when those contributions were high; the breakfast participants
fell quite far short of this golden rule (Fig. 2C). In the punishment game, no-
breakfast participants were significantly less likely to avail themselves of the
option to punish. The consequence was that the availability of punishment was,
for the no-breakfast groups, less effective at increasing contributions compared
to those made in the no-punishment game.
The increased contributions at the beginning of the no-punishment game, and
the greater propensity to match the previous contributions of others, in the no-
breakfast groups could be interpreted in terms of the hungry participants
thinking less thoroughly and deliberately about the strategic ramifications of
their decision (Orquin and Kurzban 2016; Rantapuska et al. 2017). This would
be an example of a ‘social bright side’ to limited cognitive processing, similar
to what Halali, Bereby-Meyer and Meiran (2014) observed using cognitive
depletion paradigms in trust games. In line with this, the effect of experimental
condition on initial contributions was in the same (positive) direction as the
effect of getting more of the comprehension questions wrong (although no-
breakfast participants did not get significantly more comprehension questions
wrong). Moreover, no-breakfast participants made their contribution decisions
faster than breakfast participants in the no-punishment game, although faster
decisions did not lead to higher contrbutions overall in this game.
The lessened effectiveness of the availability of punishment in increasing contribu-
tion levels in the no-breakfast groups was not because no-breakfast participants
responded differently to breakfast participants when they were punished. Rather, it
was because participants in the no-breakfast groups were significantly less likely to take
up the option of punishing their group-mates. As we stressed in the General Introduc-
tion, punitiveness was a variable for which predictions in either direction were possible.
On the one hand, hunger can increase aggression (DeWall et al. 2011; Bushman et al.
2014), and previous studies have shown that other state manipulations, such as time
pressure, lack of sleep or ego depletion tend to increase punitiveness (Sutter et al. 2003;
Anderson and Dickinson 2010; Halali et al. 2014). On the other hand, two recent
studies found that hunger reduced moral disapproval (Vicario et al. 2018) and the
severity of suggested punishments (Kerry et al. 2019). Our punishment finding is in
line with the latter results.
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Comparison of Experiments
Our two experiments present apparently mixed results: no significant condition
effects in experiment 1, and three different significant effects of condition in
experiment 2. As we stressed in the General Introduction, the two paradigms used
differ in their interaction richness and the pathways to the evolution or demise of
cooperation that they allow the experimenter to measure. Nonetheless, some pa-
rameters of the two experiments can be compared to one another. For example, both
experiments contain a measure of initial generosity: the proposer’s offer in the UG,
and the first-round no punishment game contribution in the PGG. These are not
identical; for example, in the UG the proposer may be anticipating the risk of a
rejection in deciding on their offer, which is not applicable to the PGG. Nonethe-
less, it may be worthwhile comparing these two variables. A second pair of
comparable parameters is to do with punitiveness: the responder’s minimum ac-
ceptable offer in the UG, and the propensity to punish in the PGG. Both involve
reducing the payoff of another player at cost to self. Again, the analogy is not
perfect: in the PGG but not UG, the relevant behaviour is specifically described as
punishment. Thus, for two of the three significant effects in experiment 2, there was
a parameter of experiment 1 that was arguably comparable. The third significant
effect, the extent to which players’ contributions in a round were influenced by the
other players’ contributions in the previous round of the no-punishment game, had
no counterpart in experiment 1.
For the significant findings of experiment 2, we therefore systematically compared
the parameter estimates across the two experiments where possible (Fig. 4). Where
there were arguably comparable measures across the two experiments, we combined
them using a random-effects meta-analysis (for methods information see Fig. 4
caption). Precision of parameter estimation was lower for experiment 1 due to the
smaller sample size. The significantly greater generosity of no-breakfast participants in
the first round of experiment 2, and the non-significant trend in the same direction of
experiment 1, combined to give a significant positive effect overall (B = 0.24, s.e. 0.12,
z = 2.00, p = 0.045). The significantly reduced punitiveness of no-breakfast participants
in experiment 2 combined with a non-significant trend in the opposite direction in
Fig. 4 Comparison of significant experimental effects from experiment 2 to analogous parameters from
experiment 1 where applicable. Points and braces represent parameter estimates and their 95% confidence
intervals. Contributions were standardized to facilitate comparison across studies. Diamonds represent com-
bined meta-analytic estimates and their 95% confidence intervals. Meta-analytic estimation used random
effects estimated by reduced maximum likelihood using R package ‘metafor’
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experiment 1, to give a null effect overall (B = −0.04, s.e. 0.18, z = −0.20, p = 0.85).
Thus, to the extent that we can consider the two experiments comparable, and for the
cases where analogous parameters are measured in both, the overall evidence supports
great initial generosity of hungry people, but the evidence on reduced punitiveness is
mixed. The greater influence of what the other players are doing on hungry people is
only estimated in experiment 2.
General Discussion
We have presented two experiments on the effects of acute hunger on cooperation
processes. Experiment 1 used a single-shot UG game and, replicating an earlier study,
found no effects of participants having skipped breakfast. Experiment 2 went beyond
the existing literature and used a task featuring repeated interactions between the same
players, and the explicit possibility of punishment. Here, we found systematic differ-
ences according to whether group members had skipped breakfast or not. The differ-
ences were complex.
First, no-breakfast participants started out in the no-punishment game by contribut-
ing more to the common fund. Second, in subsequent rounds, they were more
influenced in their contributions by what their group-mates had contributed in the
previous round. Specifically, no-breakfast participants came closer to matching high
contributions that their group-mates had made, whereas breakfast participants fell well
short of this. This meant that as long as the other members had made high contributions
initially, high levels of contribution were maintained in the no-breakfast groups. This
appears to be an example of a ‘social bright side’ of limited elaborate processing of the
situation (Halali et al. 2014; Rand 2016; Rantapuska et al. 2017), given that no-
breakfast participants also spent less time thinking about their contributions in the
no-punishment game. This may have meant they were less likely to realise that non-
contribution is the income-maximising strategy in the PGG without punishment,
regardless of what other group members do. It is also consistent with a hypothesis
suggested by Nettle (2019), that hunger will produce a shift away from expensive
individual cognitive effort, and towards the less effortful imitation of others.
Third, the availability of punishment was less effective at boosting contributions in
the no-breakfast groups than in the breakfast groups. This was explained by no-
breakfast participants making less use of the punishment option for a given level of
contribution by their group mates, particularly at high contribution levels. The finding
of reduced punitiveness is consistent with the results of recent experimental studies of
the effects of hunger on moral disapproval (Vicario et al. 2018) and punitive sentiment
(Kerry et al. 2019).
Do the findings of our experiment 2 support the lay belief that hunger under-
mines social cooperation? Certainly, they suggest that once experimental tasks are
made rich enough to incorporate more complex interactional dynamics between
people, effects of hunger that are not visible using a simple DG-style task may be
seen (though these effects require replication, especially since the punitiveness
effect observed in experiment 2 was not seen in the responder role of experiment
1). However, the findings of experiment 2 cannot simply be summarized as hunger
making people ‘less’ cooperative; and indeed, contributions did not break down in
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the no-breakfast groups of experiment 2 to a markedly greater extent than in the
breakfast groups. The greater matching of group-mates’ previous high contributions
that we saw in the no-breakfast groups could lead cooperation to persist for longer
when people are hungry, contrary to the lay belief. On the other hand, the reduced
punitiveness of hungry people could lead to lower cooperation in real-world
settings, specifically in those situations where effective punishment is what sustains
the cooperative effort.
Our findings, though tentative, do at least suggest a clear avenue for future research,
namely exploring hunger effects on cooperation using richer tasks that capture more of
the diverse pathways by which real-world cooperation is maintained or fails. It would
be beneficial in future to measure emotional reactions and perceptions at the same time
as game decisions. For example, one possible emotional mediator of the reduced
punitiveness of hungry people is the reduced disgust seen when people are hungry
(Vicario et al. 2018; Kerry et al. 2019), but neither our study nor the two early ones
measured disgust directly.
If the effects of hunger on cooperation-related decisions that we observed in experi-
ment 2 prove robust, this does have real-world implications for social inequalities in
cooperation and anti-social behaviour. The most deprived communities in affluent
countries such as the USA and UK feature surprisingly high levels of hunger and food
insecurity (Weinreb et al. 2002; Gundersen et al. 2011; Nettle 2017). These same
communities also often feature high crime rates, low trust, and low expectations that
others will cooperate (Sampson et al. 1997; Nettle et al. 2011; Holland et al. 2012;
Schroeder et al. 2014). In particular, they tend to be characterised by low ‘collective
efficacy’, that is, unwillingness of people to intervene to uphold norms of behaviour
(Sampson et al. 1997). Low collective efficacy is reminiscent of the reduced punitiveness
under hunger that we observed in experiment 2, and was also seen in previous studies
(Vicario et al. 2018; Kerry et al. 2019). On the other hand, observers often experience
deprived communities as having greater immediate friendliness and sociability (see Hill
et al. 2014; Nettle 2015), which is reminiscent of our higher contribution level in the
initial round of the no-punishment game. Thus, the diverse effects we have observed, if
they prove replicable, could be relevant to understanding how different communities can
have such divergent outcomes when it comes to pro- and anti-social behaviour.
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Appendix
Table 1 Full model output for experiment 2
Model Data Outcome Predictor B (s.e.) t or z p value
1 All Contribution Previous rounds −0.49 (0.05) −10.25 <0.001
Game 1.54 (0.36) 4.28 <0.001
Condition 1.96 (0.90) 2.17 0.033
Previous rounds * Game 0.69 (0.07) 10.15 <0.001
Previous rounds * Condition −0.12 (0.07) −1.76 0.079
Game * Condition −1.42 (0.52) −2.75 0.006
Previous rounds *
Game * Condition
0.18 (0.10) 1.83 0.067
2 No-punishment game,
first round
Contribution Condition 1.94 (0.73) 2.66 0.008
3 No-punishment game,
rounds 2–10
Contribution Lagged own
contribution
0.41 (0.02) 5.36 <0.001
Lagged mean
contribution of others
0.24 (0.04) 6.03 <0.001
Condition −0.83 (0.49) −1.67 0.096
Lagged mean
contribution of
others*Condition
0.14 (0.05) 2.70 0.007
4 Punishment game Decision to
punish
Mean contribution
of others
−0.31 (0.11) −2.88 0.004
Condition −0.41 (0.35) −1.17 0.243
Mean contribution
of others * Condition
−0.52 (0.16) −3.14 0.002
5 Punishment game Response to
punishment
Lagged contribution 0.45 (0.05) 9.93 <0.001
Condition 0.57 (1.18) 0.48 0.630
Lagged punishment 2.17 (0.68) 3.20 0.001
Lagged contribution *
Condition
−0.01 (0.06) −0.09 0.929
Lagged contribution *
Lagged punishment
−0.17 (0.05) −3.36 <0.001
Condition * Lagged
punishment
−0.06 (0.96) −0.06 0.954
Lagged contribution *
Condition * Lagged
punishment
0.02 (0.07) 0.23 0.820
6 All Log latency
to decide
contribution
Previous rounds −0.13 (0.01) −21.43 <0.001
Game −0.03 (0.05) −0.55 0.583
Condition −0.21 (0.06) −3.62 <0.001
Previous rounds * Game 0.02 (0.009) 2.27 0.023
Previous rounds * Condition 0.01 (0.01) 1.53 0.127
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